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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050734-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals convictions for possession of a controlled substance, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(a)(i) (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court commit plain error when it did not sua sponte grant 
unspecified relief when defendant objected that the State had breached the Plea Agreement 
by opposing a defense proposal to place him on probation and require only that he participate 
in Job Corps? 
Standard of Review: Although defendant objected to the State's comment 
concerning Job Corps, he did not request the relief he seeks on appeal, i.e., vacation of his 
guilty plea. Accordingly, he did not raise the issue "'to a level of consciousness such that the 
trial judge [could] consider it.'" State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, % 15, 54 P.3d 645 
(citation omitted). Accordingly, the issue is unpreserved and this Court should review it, if 
at all, for plain error. Id. Given that defendant has not claimed plain error or exceptional 
circumstances, this Court should decline to review the claim at all. 
Issue 2: Assuming arguendo that the State breached the Plea Agreement at the 
sentencing hearing, is the proper remedy remand to the trial court for resentencing? 
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies. 
Issue 3: Is this Court without jurisdiction to consider defendant's claim that his trial 
counsel was ineffective in not moving to withdraw his guilty plea? 
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There are no dispositive constitutional provisions, statutes or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In April 2005, defendant was charged with one count of possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) with priors. R. 1-2. 
Defendant was released from jail on his own recognizance, but his bail was set at 
$3500 after he tested positive for methamphetamine use. R. 8, 11, 14-15. 
On May 26, 2005, defendant pleaded guilty as charged in exchange for the State's 
silence as to any prison recommendation. R. 16-17. 
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On July 7, 2005, defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15 years at the Utah State Prison. R. 
22. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 37. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel 
(Plea Agreement, Addendum A) memorializing the terms of defendant's plea bargain reads 
in pertinent part as follows: 
Punishment[:] . . .Up to 1 to 15 years prison and fines up to $18,500. 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty are: On 
or about April 19, 2005, in David County, the defendant having been 
previously convicted of unlawful possession or use of a controlled 
substance, did knowingly and intentionally possessor use a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine. 
Plea Bargain. My guilty plea is the result of a plea bargain between 
myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provision of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, 
including those explained below: 
Defendant to plead as charged, state will stipulate to a double 4021 
per statute if defendant is granted and completes probation without any 
violation; otherwise silent on sentencing? 
1
 Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (West 2004), the trial court has discretion to 
reduce an offense by one degree if the court determines it would be "unduly harsh to record 
the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute . . ." "An offense 
may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the prosecutor specifically agrees 
in writing or on the court record that he offense may be reduced two degrees." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-402(3). 
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R. 20, 22 (italics added to indicate handwritten additions to the plea form). 
After entry of the guilty plea, the trial court ordered the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole to prepare a pre-sentence report (PSR) for use in determining a 
proper sentence for defendant. R. 56:4. The PSR reported that defendant had at least two 
and as many as seven juvenile offenses each year beginning in 1996 and continuing to 
2000 when he turned 18. R. 62 (PSR at 5). As an adult, defendant had five felonies, 
three for possession of a controlled substance and two DUIs. R. 63 (PSR at 6). 
The PSR also reported that defendant had been through numerous drug 
rehabilitation programs, including Drug Court, the Day Reporting Center (DRC), 
Intensive Outpatient Therapy (IOP), the Addictions Treatment Unit (ATU), Weber 
Mental Health, David Behavioral Health and Narcotics Anonymous. R. 59, 65 (PSR at 2, 
8). It also stated that defendant did not "not feel drug abuse counseling would benefit 
him at this time due to believing he has been taught enough and needs to use what he has 
been taught." R. 59 (PSR at 2). 
Defendant hoped that the court would impose probation and require him to 
participate in Job Corps. R. 56:2. The PSR examiner, however, disagreed. "It is 
respectfully recommended . . . that the defendant, Brandon James Briggs, be denied the 
2
 In his brief, defendant misquotes the language of the plea agreement by stating that 
the agreement required the State to be "otherwise silent at sentencing." See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 
3. In fact, the agreement requires the State to be "otherwise silent on sentencing." R. 22. 
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privilege of community supervision and be committed to the Utah State Prison as 
prescribed by law." R. 58 (PSR at 1). 
Defendant's counsel was surprised at the PSR's recommendation of prison. He 
told the trial court that "prison is not really the answer for Mr. Briggs. We can come up 
with some alternative and make sure he's getting gainful employment. That seems to be 
when he gets into difficulties when he's out of work." R. 55:2. The court granted 
defendant additional time to approach AP&P to attempt to persuade the investigators to 
provide a different recommendation. R. 55:2-3. 
A week later, defendant was back in court to report that AP&P was unmoved and 
was still recommending prison. R. 54:4 {see Transcript, Sentencing Hearing, Addendum 
B). Nonetheless, defendant's counsel urged the court to impose probation and require 
that defendant participate in Job Corps. R. 54:2, 4. Counsel stated that defendant had 
successfully completed all of the treatment programs in which he had been enrolled, but 
that he always relapsed when he was returned to the community and faced with prospect 
of "earning his own way." R. 54:3. 
"I think there is a lot of good in him that if we could get tunneled in the right 
direction he can be a productive member of society. I'm not convinced that frankly the 
Utah State Prison is going to help him accomplish that in terms of helping him with some 
life skills. I think the Job Corps program has a good reputation. They monitor the drug 
use through regular U.A.s and they have a tolerance level that's very low." R. 54:3-4. 
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Defendant also expressed his desire to participate in Job Corps. "I had done really 
good while I was on probation while I was staying clean/5 he said. "I got off probation 
and I lost that supervision. I lost my job and everything." R. 54:5. 
When the court asked the State's view, the prosecutor at first demurred, noting 
that the Plea Agreement required the State to remain silent on prison. R. 54:6. 
"However, with regard to Job Corps and the State believed that would be a step 
backwards from what he's already participated in." Id. The prosecutor also noted that 
AP&P had indicated that it is difficult to supervise an individual who is participating in 
Job Corps. "Further, and he's listed as a high-risk defendant. Job Corps drugs run 
rampant[,] is my experience, and I don't believe that it would provide a good place for 
him. I think he would just reoffend." R. 54:7. 
Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's comments. "I think under the 
circumstances where there is [sic] two alternatives on the table, I think speaking against 
Job Corps and the other comment is essentially a back-door recommendation for prison, 
violation of the plea agreement." Id. 
The court opted to follow the recommendations in the PSR and sentenced 
defendant to prison. The court noted that defendant had a "fairly extensive" [record] for 
a 22-year old young man," and defendant agreed. R. 54:8. The court also pointed out 
that defendant had been through extensive treatment for his drug addictions, none of 
which had ultimately proved successful. Id. "Every agency that the State had to help you 
. . . had been afforded .. ." R. 54:8-9. 
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The court then elaborated its reasons for sentencing defendant to prison: 
Now, the important thing is this: An agency that is trying to help you 
overcome the drug problem, all they can do is help you. The real person to 
overcome the drug problem is that individual and what's in their mind. 
And they have to decide drugs are not for me. And I'm not going to get 
involved and that's the end. And going through these programs they are 
designed to help you come to that mental attitude. Obviously you haven't. 
And you've continued to use drugs and you are before me today on a 
second-degree felony, illegal possession or use of a controlled substance, 
and you are considered to be high risk. 
The next thing I want to observe is that given what Mr. Utzinger has 
said, Mr. Cox has indicated that they would evaluate you and likely accept 
you [at Job Corps], but that evaluation has not been completed. And I take 
it there's nothing in writing saying, indeed I will; that is the organization 
will accept you. And, moreover, if it does, it makes it difficult for AP&P to 
even supervise you. 
Lastly and probably more important than the first two, I think is this: 
You indicated through your counsel that unfortunately you're immature and 
you've let things divert you and therefore you want to be given another 
second alternative because you've been diverted by other matters of life. In 
honesty, Mr. Briggs, that is not a persuasive argument to this court. You 
are 22 years old. Being in these—involved in these particular agencies has 
given you, I'm convinced, a complete total understanding of drugs, what 
they do, what you have to do to get off the program. And when I say off 
the program, I mean to eliminate drugs in your life. You have not done that 
and you've indicated that it's someone else's responsibility 'cause you 
haven't done that. I disagree with that. 
MR. BRIGGS: It's my responsibility. 
THE COURT: It is your responsibility. There's no question about 
that. And you must understand that it's your responsibility, and make the 
commitment so it's long-lasting. 
Given that circumstance, Mr. Briggs, while I recognize you are a young 
man, I also recognize that you've been given everything the State can give 
to you. You've been given numerous opportunities. AP&P is not 
modifying the recommendation notwithstanding the good efforts of your 
lawyer to look at this alternative. Therefore, I think it's appropriate that I 
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follow the recommendation. And given your second-degree felony 
conviction, the possession of controlled substance, Mr. Briggs, I 
respectfully sentence you to Utah State prison for an indeterminate term of 
one to 15 years. 
R. 54:9-10. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The State did not breach the Plea Agreement. Properly interpreted, the 
Plea Agreement prohibited the State from recommending prison, but allowed comments 
and recommendations on other sentencing options, including probation. Alternatively, if 
the State's rejection of Job Corps as a probation option violated the agreement, any 
breach was not material and substantial and, therefore, requires no remedy. 
Point II: If this Court determines that the State materially breached the Plea 
Agreement, the case should be remanded to the trial court for resentencing before a 
different judge without the State's recommendation against Job Corps. 
Point III: Because a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea is jurisdictional, 
defendant cannot pursue on direct appeal his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in 
not filing a motion to withdraw his plea. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE DID NOT BREACH THE PLEA AGREEMENT; 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT 
INQUIRING INTO THE ALLEGED BREACH. 
Defendant faults the trial court for allegedly not properly inquiring into the defense 
claim that the State breached the Plea Agreement when the prosecutor opposed defendant's 
proposal that he be allowed to participate in Job Corps for probation. See Aplt. Br. at 7. 
"The record on appeal demonstrates that the State unilaterally violated the plea agreement by 
not remaining silent at sentencing and instead substantially making a recommendation for 
prison." Aplt. Br. at 10. This claim fails, first, because it is unpreserved and defendant has 
not argued plain error or exceptional circumstances. Second, the claim fails because the 
State did not breach the Plea Agreement by rejecting a inappropriate probation proposal. 
A. Defendant's Claim that the State Breached the Plea Agreement 
Fails Because It Is Unpreserved and Defendant Has Not Argued 
Plain Error or Exceptional Circumstances. 
Defendant did not properly preserve his claim that the State breached the Plea 
Agreement and he has not claimed plain error or exceptional circumstances. "As a general 
rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, H 11, 10 P.3d 346. "Utah courts require specific objections in order to 'bring 
all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the 
errors if appropriate."' State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, H 14,54 P.3d 645 (quoting State v. 
Brown, 856P.2d358,361 (UtahApp. 1993)). To preserve a claim, a defendant must specify 
the alleged error so that the trial court can "'assess [the] allegations by isolating relevant 
9 
facts and considering them in the context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue.'" Id. 
at U 15 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d at 361). "[T]he preservation rule applies to every claim, 
including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional 
circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 11 11. The 
exceptional circumstances exception is "ill-defined . . . and applies primarily to rare 
procedural anomalies." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n. 3 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant claims he preserved his claim by objecting to the State's comments 
concerning the Job Corps proposal. Aplt. Br. at 1 (citing R. 54:7). During the sentencing 
hearing, defendant's counsel asked the court to impose a sentence in which defendant would 
be placed on probation and required to participate in Job Corps training. R. 54-2-5. When 
asked for the State's view, the prosecutor stated that Job Corps was not an appropriate option 
for a "high-risk defendant" who would most likely "just reoffend." R. 54:7. In response, 
defense counsel made the following statement: 
I guess for the record I would object to the State's comments. I think under 
the circumstances where there is [sic] two alternatives on the table, I think 
speaking against Job Corps and the other comment is essentially a back-door 
recommendation for prison, violation of the plea agreement. 
Id. Counsel did not request a ruling from the court or request any relief. Certainly, he did 
not move to withdraw defendant's guilty plea—the relief he seeks on appeal. See Aplt Br. at 
13-14. Such a motion would have given the court the opportunity to "'assess [the] 
allegations by isolating relevant facts and considering them in the context of the specific 
legal doctrine placed at issue.'" Hardy, 2002 UT App 244 at If 15 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d 
at 361). Defendant did neither. Accordingly, to raise this claim at all on appeal, he must 
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claim plain error of exceptional circumstances. His failure to do so is fatal to this claim. See 
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229, n.5 (Utah 1995) (where defendant fails to raise issue 
to the trial court and does not argue exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal, issue 
is waived and appellate court may decline to review it). 
B. The State Did Not Breach the Plea Agreement. 
Even if this Court were to reach defendant's claim that the State breached the Plea 
Agreement, the claim still fails because the prosecutor's rejection of the Job Corps proposal 
was consistent with the terms of the agreement. 
"It is well established that a prosecutor may not make promises which induce a guilty 
plea and then refuse to keep those promises." State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266,1275 (Utah 
1988); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971). A plea agreement binds 
the prosecutor and the defendant to its terms, much like a contract. See State v. Patience, 
944 P.2d 381, 386 (Utah App. 1997) (noting that many courts treat plea agreements like 
contracts); cf. United States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273 (3rd Cir. 1977) (defendant cannot hold 
the prosecution to more than it has promised). Nevertheless, although plea agreements are 
analogous to contracts, they are not actually contracts. State v. Gladney, 951 P.2d 247, 248 
(Utah App. 1998) (citing United States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353,358 (5th Cir. 1980); but see 
United States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541-42 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that "plea agreements 
are like contracts; however, they are not contracts, and therefore contract doctrines do not 
always apply to them"). 
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The State's obligations under the Plea Agreement concern sentencing. In exchange 
for defendant's guilty plea, the State agreed to 
(1) a "double 402 reduction" //the defendant is granted and successfully 
completes probation and 
(2) to be "otherwise silent on sentencing." 
R. 20 (Plea Agreement at 3). Defendant claims this provision prohibited the State from 
making any sentencing recommendations. Aplt. Br. at 10. Defendant is incorrect. The 
provision does not require the State's silence "at sentencing," but rather to be "otherwise 
silent on sentencing," a provision both parties understood to preclude the State from 
recommending prison. Compare, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 10 with R. 54:6-7. 
Indeed, the record clearly demonstrates the Plea Agreement required the State's 
silence only as to prison. At the sentencing hearing, when the court asked for the State's 
view of the Job Corps recommendation, the prosecutor first stated that "with regard to the 
issue of prison. . . the State agreed to remain silent on that issue." R. 54:6. And when 
defense counsel objected to the State's comments opposing the Job Corps option, he did so, 
not because the prosecutor did not remain silent generally, but because he believed the 
prosecutor's comments constituted an implicit recommendation for prison. "[W]here there is 
[sic] two alternatives on the table, I think speaking against Job Corps . . . is essentially a 
back-door recommendation for prison, [in] violation of the plea agreement." R. 54:7. This 
interpretation of the Plea Agreement as only precluding the State from recommending prison 
is also consistent with defendant's arguments on appeal. In his brief, defendant alleges that 
"[t]he record on appeal demonstrates that the State unilaterally violated the plea agreement 
12 
by not remaining silent at sentencing and instead substantially making a recommendation for 
prison." Aplt. Br. at 10. 
Moreover, the State's opposition to the Job Corps proposal was not, as defendant 
claims, a '"back-door recommendation for prison."' See R. 54:7; Aplt. Br. at 10. Defendant 
claims he had only two sentencing options—Job Corps or prison—and that the State's 
rejection of the Job Corps option amounted to a recommendation for prison. See id. 
Defendant is incorrect. In fact, there were many other sentencing alternatives. Defendant 
simply chose to artificially narrow his sentencing options by focusing exclusively on Job 
Corps as the only viable probation possibility. As a practical matter, defendant's options 
may have been more limited than the first-time offender, but that is only because the 
defendant's unwillingness or inability to stop using drugs may have made the court reluctant 
to send him back to one of the many treatment programs he had already completed. Still, a 
trial court has wide discretion in fashioning conditions of probation to suit individual needs 
and alternatives to Job Corps were available. See, e.g., State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 n. 9 
(Utah 1982) (trial judge has broad discretion in selecting appropriate punishment from 
among a number of alternatives). In any event, the Plea Agreement does not obligate the 
State's silence on probation issues and the prosecutor's comments, therefore, did not violate 
the agreement. 
In sum, the State did not violate the plea agreement. The State was allowed to make 
recommendations concerning probation, but was required to remain "otherwise silent on 
13 
sentencing/' a provision the parties understood as requiring the State's silence only as to 
prison. The State kept its part of the bargain and any claim to the contrary must be rejected. 
C. Any Breach Was Not "Substantial and Material." 
Alternatively, any breach by the State was not substantial or material and defendant is 
not entitled to any remedy. Not all breaches of a plea agreement require a remedy. State v. 
Bowers, 696 N.W.2d 255,259 (Wis. App. 2005). A defendant is not entitled to relief when 
the breach is merely a technical one rather than a substantial and material breach of the 
agreement. Id. A material and substantial breach of a plea agreement is one that violates the 
terms of the agreement and deprives the defendant of a material and substantial benefit for 
which he or she bargained. Id. 
The State's comments did not deprive defendant of the benefit of his bargain. The 
prosecutor made no reference to prison. His comments were brief and focused 
specifically on the Job Corps proposal. But even if, as defendant alleges, the State's 
rejection of Job Corps as a probation option amounted to a "back-door recommendation 
for prison," such a breach was immaterial in light of the defendant's long history of drug 
offenses and the strong recommendation for prison contained in the PSR. The PSR stated 
that defendant had at least two and as many as seven juvenile offenses each year 
beginning in 1996 and continuing to 2000 when he turned 18. R. 62 (PSR at 5). As an 
adult, defendant had five felonies, three for possession of a controlled substance and two 
DUIs. R. 63 (PSR at 6). Ultimately, the PSR placed defendant in the "'High' Risk and 
Needs category" and recommended that he be sentenced to prison. R. 58-59 (PSR at 1-
14 
2). The PSR evaluator stuck to that recommendation even when given an opportunity to 
revise it. See R. 54:2, 4. 
It is also clear from the transcript of the sentencing hearing that the trial court 
relied heavily on the PSR in sentencing defendant to prison. Without specifically 
referring to the report, the trial court noted that defendant had been through many 
treatment programs without making the internal changes needed to stop using drugs. R. 
54:8-9. The court then stated that the PSR reported that defendant had a "fairly 
extensive" adult record for a 22-year-old and defendant agreed. R. 54:8. In conclusion, 
the court pointed out that "AP&P is not modifying the recommendation [for prison] 
notwithstanding the good efforts of your lawyer to look at this alternative. Therefore, I 
think it's appropriate that I follow the recommendation." R. 54:10. 
Because the court was clearly relying primarily on the PSR in sentencing defendant to 
prison, any indirect recommendation the State may have made for prison had little if any 
influence on the court. Accordingly, assuming the State's rejection of Job Corps was a 
breach, it was not a material or substantial breach and defendant is not entitled to any 
remedy. 
II. IF THE STATE BREACHED THE AGREEMENT, THE 
PROPER REMEDY IS A NEW SENTENCING HEARING, NOT 
WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA. 
Defendant claims that the State's alleged breach of the Plea Agreement requires 
remand to the trial court "for a determination of whether Mr. Briggs desires to have the 
guilty plea withdrawn . . ." Aplt. Br. at 13-14. If this Court were to reach defendant's 
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unpreserved claim and determine that the State violated the agreement, remand to the trial 
court would be required. However, this Court should not order that defendant's plea be 
withdrawn, but only that the trial court determine the appropriate remedy. "[T]he remedy for 
a defendant where the State fails to fulfill its side of the bargain is frequently specific 
performance." State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988); see also, State v. Garfield, 552 
P.2d 129, 131 (Utah 1976) (holding that if prosecutor failed to recommend probation as 
agreed, defendant is entitled to resentencing with the agreed recommendation from 
prosecutor). This Court has held that when the State breaches a plea agreement, the trial 
court is in the best position to determine whether the proper remedy is specific performance 
or withdrawal of the plea. State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, \ 17, 95 P.3d 1203.3 
Accordingly, if this Court concludes the State breached the Plea Agreement, the case should 
be remanded for further consideration by different judge. 
III. THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HIS ATTORNEY WAS 
INEFFECTIVE IN NOT MOVING TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA. 
Defendant claims his attorney was ineffective in not moving to withdraw the 
guilty plea after the State allegedly breached the Plea Agreement. See Aplt. Br. at 11-
13. This claim fails because the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it. 
Under Utah law, a defendant is required to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
3
 Although technically dicta because the Smit Court held that there was no breach of 
the plea agreement in that case, the Court's unequivocal statement on this issue leaves little 
doubt that remand is the proper remedy. 
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"shall be made by motion before sentence is announced." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) 
(West 2004). Defendant did not do so and that failure "extinguishe[d] [defendant's] right to 
challenge the validity of the guilty plea on appeal," State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,^ [ 3,40 P.3d 
630, including his right to challenge the validity of the plea on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. State v. Sousa, 2003 UT App 320,2003 WL 22208919 (Memorandum 
Decision, Addendum C) (citing State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392, ffif 7-8, 40 P.3d 646). 
As this Court explained in Sousa, section 77-13-6 "does not permit this court, in this 
direct appeal, to extend the thirty-day period for filing a motion to withdraw a plea or, 
although that period has run, to set aside Defendant's plea because of post-plea ineffective 
assistance of counsel." Id. (citing Melo, 2001 UT App 392 at ^  7-8). Moreover, the Court's 
inability to consider an ineffective assistance claim does not violate defendant's right to seek 
redress from the courts, see Utah Const, art. I, § 11, because defendant may seek redress by 
petitioning for post-conviction relief. Id. 
Accordingly, defendant's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to 
withdraw his guilty plea fails because this Court is without jurisdiction to consider it. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction or, if this 
Court concludes that the State breached the Plea Agreement, the case should be remanded to 
the trial court for resentencing. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision[-]making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18, \ 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the 
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 
560 (Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would be "significantly aided 
by oral argument." Utah. R. App. P. 29(a). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of April, 2006. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14 day of April, 20061 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid two 
copies of the foregoing to: 
SCOTT L. WIGGINS 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
57 West 200 South 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
Salt LakeCity, Utah 84101 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUD 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STA 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 0*s'\lOO6Xz> 
I, BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and 
that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty to the following crime(s): 
B 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
Degree 
QLZE^PA 
fcgje. y 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
Uf & lh> /^y<tor* J^r/cL 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it read to 
me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty are: 
OA ^ a^J- ft an I it^JPT ;^ 
'//S-c J& 
Yr C/uSy 
fi T 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) listed 
above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons 
for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty plea and 
prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading ffuiltv.-
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and < 
On April 19, 2005 the defendant was searched incident to an arrest on a warrant. Upon searching 
the defendant, the police officer found a baggie containing a substance that tested positive for 
methamphetamine. The defendant has been twice before convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering this plea voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the 
constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up all the 
following rights: 
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford 
one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might later, if the 
judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not) ^avc^waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty. I also 
understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea. 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is ^B^^ C^TZ^ t-yz^-+ 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my 
guilty plea. 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury 
and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, 
(a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and (b) my attorney, 
or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the 
witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I 
chose to and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those 
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to testify, no one 
could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know that if I chose not to testify, 
the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I am 
presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the 
charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State 
would have the burden of proving each element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is 
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
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I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be admitting 
that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I would 
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an appeal, the State 
would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I 
plead guilty. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the statutory and 
constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime to which 
I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be 
subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a 
prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crime(s), including 
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime involved, 
the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the same time 
(concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead to. I also 
know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on 
parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states 
on the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. My guilty plea is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting 
attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this 
statement, including those explained below: 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of 
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any 
opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
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Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful influence 
of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this 
statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. '' f*^ 
1 amc*42v Years of age. I have attended school through the grade. I can read and 
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to me. 
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment 
when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or 
intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and 1o be mentally capable of understanding 
these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease, defect, or 
impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I must move to withdraw my plea before 
my sentence is announced. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show it was not knowingly 
and voluntarily made. 
Dated this j 2 ^ d a y of _ ^ , 2 0 o C 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for BRANDON JAMES BRJGGS, the defendant above, and that I 
know defendant has read the statement or that I have read it to defendant; I have discussed it with 
defendant and believe that defendant fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; 
and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing 
affidavit, are accurate and true. 
ATTORJffiY^OR^^NDANT 
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against BRANDON JAMES 
BRIGGS, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations 
are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record 
before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of 
defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea is entered and that the acceptance of the plea would serve 
the public interest. 
PROSECUTION ATTORNEY 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and 
counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds that 
the defendant's guilty plea is freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea to the crime(s) set forth in the 
Statement be accepted and entered. ^ //i /? 
Dated this J^M of /y/J^t^ , 20oJ? 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS SSOU^TYp ^ J 1 
STATE OF UTAH 
k -k -k k -k 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS, 
DEFENDANT. 
VIDEO TRANSCRIPT 
CASE NO. 051700620 
* * * * * 
JULY 7 , 2005 
HONORABLE DARWIN C. HANSEN 
•k k -k k -k 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
MR. BRANDON L. POLL 
MR. TODD A. UTZINGER 
TRANSCRIBED BY: JOANNE PRATT, RPR U FILED* * ** "-
800 WEST STATE STREET
 U T A H APPELLATE COURT? 
FARMINGTON, UTAH 84025 
SEP 2 3 2005 
ntritfn?d*LA 
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JULY 7, 2005. 
THE COURT: STATE OF UTAH AGAINST BRANDON JAMES 
BRIGGS. YOU ARE MR. BRIGGS; IS THAT CORRECT, SIR? 
MR. BRIGGS: YES. 
THE COURT: MR. BRIGGS, THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR 
SENTENCING. 
AND COUNSEL, HAVE YOU RECEIVED A COPY OF THE PRESENTENCE 
REPORT? 
MR. UTZINGER: YES, YOUR HONOR. REFRESH THE COURT'S 
MEMORY FOR THE RECORD. WE WERE HERE LAST WEEK FOR THE 
POSSIBILITY OF DOING SENTENCING. AND FRANKLY, I WAS 
SURPRISED BY THE — I CAN'T SAY SURPRISED, BUT DISAPPOINTED 
IN THE RECOMMENDATION, GIVEN SOME INPUT FROM MR. KEDDINGTON. 
AND SO WE RESET THIS FOR A WEEK SO I COULD DETERMINE WHETHER 
JOB CORP WOULD ADMIT HIM INTO THEIR PROGRAM AS A POSSIBLE 
ALTERNATIVE TO SENDING HIM TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON. 
I SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH WITH MR. RON COX, DIRECTOR OF 
ADMISSIONS, OR ONE OF THE DIRECTORS OF ADMISSIONS PERSONNEL, 
SHOULD SAY. HE'S INDICATED THAT DESPITE THE CRIMINAL 
CONVICTION, THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO SCREEN MR. BRIGGS AND 
THAT WOULD NOT DISQUALIFY HIM FOR THE PROGRAM BY EXPLAINING 
HE'S HAD NUMEROUS OPPORTUNITIES IN TREATMENT BEFORE. 
AND THEN REVIEW OF — I THINK IT'S FAIR TO SAY BOTH MR. 
KEDDINGTON AND MY CLIENT'S GRANDFATHER, WHO'S HERE, ONE OF TH 
BIGGEST PROBLEMS FOR MR. BRIGGS IS NOT THAT HE HASN'T HAD AN 
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OPPORTUNITY FOR TREATMENT; JUST THAT HE HASN'T MATURED ENOUGH 
TO REALLY APPRECIATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEEDING TO WORK A 
REGULAR JOB AND DEVELOP SOME LIFE SKILLS. IN TALKING WITH THE 
GRANDFATHER, IT'S CLEAR THAT MR. BRIGGS, AS REFLECTED SOMEWHA? 
IN THE REPORT, DID NOT HAVE A PARTICULARLY HEALTHY UPBRINGING 
IN TERMS OF PARENTAL GUIDANCE. MOTHER ESSENTIALLY WAS OFF THE 
SCENE, AND FATHER HAS BEEN BATTLING ALCOHOL FOR MANY YEARS. 
SO FRANKLY, NO GOOD ROLE MODEL THERE. GRANDPARENTS ATTEMPTED 
TO INTERVENE THE LAST FEW YEARS AND HAD A NUMBER OF TREATMENT 
PROGRAMS THEY HAVE ATTEMPTED. 
IRONICALLY ENOUGH, HE'S COMPLETED ALL THE PROGRAMS 
SUCCESSFULLY. BUT THEN, ONCE PUT OUT ON HIS OWN AND THE NEED 
TO GO GET A JOB AND START EARNING HIS OWN WAY TO PARAPHRASE 
THE GRANDFATHER, TENDED NOT TO TAKE THAT AS SERIOUSLY AS HE 
SHOULD. AND GRANDFATHER IT SAYS HE'S TRYING TO GET SOME 
PIDDLY JOB, TRYING TO GET BY AND TRYING TO GET SOME PIDDLY JO$ 
THAT SORT OF GET BY AND FIND HIMSELF BACK IN THE CIRCLE OF 
USING DRUGS. 
HE'S RECENTLY TURNED — WELL, HE'S 22 YEARS OLD, YOUR 
HONOR. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED I BELIEVE IT WAS IN FEBRUARY Ofc 
JANUARY. HE'S STILL A YOUNG MAN. AND IN MEETING WITH HIM, I 
THINK THERE'S A LOT OF GOOD IN HIM THAT IF WE COULD GET 
FUNNELED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, HE CAN BE A PRODUCTIVE MEMBER 
OF SOCIETY. I'M NOT CONVINCED THAT FRANKLY THE UTAH STATE 
PRISON IS GOING TO HELP HIM ACCOMPLISH THAT IN TERMS OF 
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HELPING HIM DEVELOP SOME LIFE SKILLS. I THINK THE JOB CORP 
PROGRAM HAS A GOOD REPUTATION. THEY MONITOR THE DRUG USE 
THROUGH REGULAR U.A.'S AND THEY HAVE A TOLERANCE LEVEL THAT'S 
VERY LOW. HE GETS IN THAT PROGRAM AND HE ISN'T TAKING IT 
SERIOUSLY AND HE USES DRUGS IN ANY WAY, THEY ARE GOING TO 
CATCH HIM AND FRANKLY, YOUR HONOR, I REPRESENTED A NUMBER OF 
KIDS FROM JOB CORP WHO HAVE NOT STUCK WITH THE PROGRAM AND 
THEY REPORTED AND IT ENDS UP BEING CHARGED AS A CRIMINAL 
OFFENSE AND THEY END UP HERE. 
MR. BRIGGS FROM THE BEGINNING OF THIS CASE HAS BEEN VERY 
INTERESTED IN JOB CORP. MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THEY DO NOT 
LIKE TO TAKE HIM, BUT THEY WILL. THEY WILL REVIEW HIM IN THA' 
PROCESS. MR. COX TELLS ME IT TAKES ABOUT THREE TO FOUR WEEKS 
MR. KEDDINGTON WAS ALSO SUPPORTIVE OF TRYING TO COME UP WITH 
SOME ALTERNATIVE TO PRISON FOR MR. BRIGGS. HE DID MAKE A 
PITCH, MY UNDERSTANDING, ASKED AP&P TO REVIEW THIS AGAIN AND 
SEE IF AP&P WOULD ALTER ITS RECOMMENDATION. 
FRANKLY, I'M DISAPPOINTED TO SEE THE NOTE IN THE FILE IS 
THAT THEY DID RECONSIDER AND AP&P IS STILL RECOMMENDING PRISO] 
AND THAT THEIR VIEW IS, GIVEN MX UNDERSTANDING, GIVEN HIS PAS' 
TREATMENT EFFORTS, THAT THEY DON'T FEEL DIVERSION IS 
APPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT. 
I STILL WOULD ASK, YOUR HONOR, INSTEAD OF SENDING THIS 
YOUNG MAN TO PRISON AT THIS POINT, GIVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
BE EVALUATED AND SCREENED WITH JOB CORP. AND TO DO THAT NEED 
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TO ESSENTIALLY PUT HIM ON PROBATION. GIVE HIM THAT 
OPPORTUNITY, SUBMIT PROOF WITHIN TWO WEEKS THAT HE'S GONE UP 
THERE. I'VE GOT THE NUMBERS HE NEEDS TO CONTACT. HIS 
GRANDFATHER IS HERE AND I'M SURE WILL MAKE SURE THAT HE 
FOLLOWS THROUGH WITH THAT EFFORT. AND IF JOB CORP ACCEPTS HI* 
AND HE GETS IN THE PROGRAM GIVING HIM A CHANCE. IT'S A BIT 
DIFFERENT THAN HE'S HAD BEFORE AND THERE IS SOME INTENSE 
SUPERVISION ALONG WITH AN EFFORT TO TEACH HIM A JOB SKILL AND 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO FRANKLY BUILD SOME SELF-ESTEEM THAT I THINK 
IS ALSO LACKING. I THINK THAT IS ALSO REFLECTED IN THE 
REPORT. 
SO I URGE YOUR HONOR, INSTEAD OF FOLLOWING THE 
RECOMMENDATION OF AP&P, TO GIVE BRANDON ONE LAST CHANCE HERE 
KNOWING THAT HE'S FACING A ZERO TOLERANCE SITUATION. IF THERlfc 
IS A BLIP OF DISSATISFACTION FROM AP&P OR JOB CORP, THAT HE'L! 
BE HEADED TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON. 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING FOR ME, MR. BRIGGS? 
MR. BRIGGS: YES. JUST WHAT HE SAID IS EXACTLY 
RIGHT. I'VE BEEN STRUGGLING WITH AN ADDICTION FOR ALMOST TEN 
YEARS NOW. I'VE GONE THROUGH ALL SORTS OF DIFFERENT DRUGS 
AND I'VE BEEN FIGHTING IT FOR A LONG TIME. AND I HAD DONE 
REALLY GOOD WHILE I WAS ON PROBATION WHILE I WAS STAYING 
CLEAN. I GOT IT AND I GOT OFF PROBATION AND I LOST THAT 
SUPERVISION. I LOST MY JOB AND EVERYTHING. I STARTED 
FIGHTING WITH A GIRLFRIEND THAT I WAS SEEING AND I LOST 
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EVERYTHING I HAD, ALL MY TREATMENT SKILLS. I JUST THREW THEM 
OUT THE WINDOW AND I STARTED USING DRUGS AGAIN. 
WHEN I LOST MY JOB MOSTLY BECAUSE I HAD NO MONEY, I GOT 
REAL DEPRESSED. AND I APOLOGIZE. I'VE DONE A LOT OF BAD 
THINGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN I WAS ON DRUGS. 
MR. UTZINGER: I THINK THAT HIGHLIGHTS IT, YOUR 
HONOR. HE'S BEEN UNDER SUPERVISION AND BEING MONITORED. 
GRANTED, HE'S 22 YEARS OLD NOW, BUT IN SOME WAYS HIS MATURITY 
LEVEL IS MUCH LOWER THAN THAT. I THINK WITH SOME INTENSE 
SUPERVISION WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET HIM BACK ON TRACK 
HERE AND HOPEFULLY KEEP HIM ON TRACK BY MAYBE MONITORING HIM 
FOR A 36-MONTH PROBATION. IF HE'S NOT ACTUALLY FULLY 
SATISFIED THINGS WITHIN THAT PERIOD OF TIME, IT CAN BE 
EXTENDED UNDER THE STATUTE. I THINK FRANKLY JOB CORP IS A 
REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE HERE TO TEACH HIM SOME SKILLS. 
THE COURT: WHAT DOES THE STATE HAVE? 
MR. POLL: YOUR HONOR, WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF 
PRISON. THE STATE AGREED TO REMAIN SILENT ON THAT ISSUE. 
HOWEVER, WITH REGARD TO JOB CORP AND THE STATE BELIEVES THAT 
WOULD BE A STEP BACKWARDS FROM WHAT HE'S ALREADY PARTICIPATED 
IN. 
IT IS THE STATE'S BELIEF THAT CHANGE WILL OCCUR FROM 
WITHIN AND THIS INDIVIDUAL HAS ALREADY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
HAVE SEVERAL EXTERNAL PROGRAMS THAT HE'S GONE THROUGH AND HE 
HASN'T USED THOSE SKILLS, AND THE REASON BEING IS 'CAUSE THE 
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CHANGE HAS NOT OCCURRED WITHIN HIMSELF. SO I DON'T BELIEVE 
THAT JOB CORP IS APPROPRIATE. 
FURTHER, AND HE'S LISTED AS A HIGH-RISK DEFENDANT. JOB 
CORP DRUGS RUN RAMPANT IS MY EXPERIENCE, AND I DON'T BELIEVE 
THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE A GOOD PLACE FOR HIM. I THINK HE WOULD 
JUST REOFFEND. 
FURTHER AP&P INDICATES TO ME THAT IT IS EXTREMELY 
DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO SUPERVISE A HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUAL IN JOB 
CORP. THEY HAVE DIFFICULTY SETTING UP CONTACT TIMES, TRAVEL 
AND WHAT NOT. JUST THE LOGISTICS ARE DIFFICULT. IT'S NOT AS 
DIFFICULT WITH A LOW-RISK PERSON. THEY DON'T NEED INTENSIVE 
SUPERVISION. SO THE STATE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT JOB CORP 
WOULD BE APPROPRIATE WHERE HE HAS COMPLETED ALL OF THE 
TREATMENT PROGRAMS THAT YOU CAN SEE IN THE P.S.I, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MR. UTZINGER: I GUESS FOR THE RECORD I WOULD OBJECT 
TO THE STATE'S COMMENTS. I THINK UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
WHERE THERE IS TWO ALTERNATIVES ON THE TABLE, I THINK 
SPEAKING AGAINST JOB CORP AND THE OTHER COMMENT IS 
ESSENTIALLY A BACK-DOOR RECOMMENDATION FOR PRISON, VIOLATION 
OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT. 
AND YOU KNOW FINALLY, YOUR HONOR, I UNDERSTAND ALL THAT. 
I'VE READ THE REPORT AS WELL. I'VE SPENT TIME WITH 
MR. BRIGGS. AND I'M ALSO FAMILIAR WITH JOB CORP HAVING SPENT 
SOME TIME WITH MR. COX. PLAINLY THERE ARE TWO POSSIBILITIES 
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THAT COULD OCCUR THERE. THERE ARE CASES THAT COME OUT OF THA 
PROGRAM. BUT I THINK THE FACT THAT WE GET CASES FROM THEM SO 
PROMPTLY ACTUALLY ENHANCES THE ABILITY OF THAT PROGRAM TO 
ASSIST IN GIVING MR. BRIGGS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ONE LAST SHOT A 
MAKING IT. THE TREATMENT PROGRAMS THEY OBVIOUSLY THEY PROVIDi 
MECHANISMS TRYING TO AVOID THE ADDICTION AND THAT KIND OF 
THING. BUT WHAT THEY DON'T TYPICALLY ADDRESS IN JOB CORP IS 
AIMED AT ADDRESSING IS HELPING HIM BUILD A LIFE SKILL, SOME 
SORT OF EMPLOYABILITY, AND FRANKLY, AN ABILITY TO APPRECIATE 
THE NEED TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH THOSE THINGS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
MR. BRIGGS, I WANT TO MAKE A COUPLE OF COMMENTS AND THEN 
I'M GOING TO SENTENCE YOU. YOU HAVE READ THE PRESENTENCE 
REPORT, I TAKE IT, HAVEN'T YOU? 
MR. BRIGGS: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: AND THE PRESENTENCE REPORT INDICATES 
YOUR JUVENILE RECORD. IT ALSO INDICATES YOUR ADULT RECORD, 
AND IT'S FAIRLY EXTENSIVE FOR A 22-YEAR-OLD YOUNG MAN. 
MR. BRIGGS: YES, IT IS. 
THE COURT: AND IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER, YOU 
HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY OF RECEIVING ADDICTION 
TREATMENT AT THE A.T.U. ALSO DRUG COURT. ALSO INTENSIVE 
OUTPATIENT THERAPY. ALSO RSAT HERE IN THE JAIL. IN ADDITION 
TO THAT, THE DAY REPORTING, AND WEBER MENTAL HEALTH AND DAVIS 
MENTAL HEALTH. EVERY AGENCY THAT THE STATE HAS TO HELP YOU 
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WITH YOU HAVE BEEN AFFORDED THAT OPPORTUNITY. 
MR. BRIGGS: UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: NOW, THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THIS: AN 
AGENCY THAT IS TRYING TO HELP YOU OVERCOME THE DRUG PROBLEM, 
ALL THEY CAN DO IS HELP YOU. THE REAL PERSON TO OVERCOME THE 
DRUG PROBLEM IS THAT INDIVIDUAL AND WHAT'S IN THEIR MIND. 
AND THEY HAVE TO DECIDE DRUGS ARE NOT FOR ME. AND I'M NOT 
GOING TO GET INVOLVED AND THAT'S THE END. AND GOING THROUGH 
THESE PROGRAMS THEY ARE DESIGNED TO HELP YOU COME TO THAT 
MENTAL ATTITUDE. OBVIOUSLY YOU HAVEN'T. AND YOU'VE 
CONTINUED TO USE DRUGS AND YOU ARE BEFORE ME TODAY ON A 
SECOND-DEGREE FELONY, ILLEGAL POSSESSION OR USE OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, AND YOU ARE CONSIDERED TO BE HIGH RISK. 
THE NEXT THING I WANT TO OBSERVE IS THAT GIVEN WHAT MR. 
UTZINGER HAS SAID, MR. COX HAS INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD 
EVALUATE YOU AND LIKELY ACCEPT YOU, BUT THAT EVALUATION HAS 
NOT BEEN COMPLETED. AND I TAKE IT THERE'S NOTHING IN WRITING 
SAYING, INDEED I WILL; THAT IS, THAT ORGANIZATION WILL ACCEPT 
YOU. AND MOREOVER, IF IT DOES, IT MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR AP&? 
TO EVEN SUPERVISE YOU. 
LASTLY AND PROBABLY MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE FIRST TWO, I 
THINK IS THIS: YOU INDICATE THROUGH YOUR COUNSEL THAT 
UNFORTUNATELY YOU'RE IMMATURE AND YOU'VE LET THINGS DIVERT YOIJJ 
AND THEREFORE YOU WANT TO BE GIVEN ANOTHER SECOND ALTERNATIVE 
BECAUSE YOU'VE BEEN DIVERTED BY OTHER MATTERS OF LIFE. IN ALl 
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HONESTY, MR. BRIGGS, THAT IS NOT A PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT TO THI 
COURT. YOU ARE 22 YEARS OLD. BEING IN THESE — INVOLVED IN 
THESE PARTICULAR AGENCIES HAS GIVEN YOU, I'M CONVINCED, A 
COMPLETE TOTAL UNDERSTANDING OF DRUGS, WHAT THEY DO, WHAT YOU 
HAVE TO DO TO GET OFF THE PROGRAM. AND WHEN I SAY OFF THE 
PROGRAM, I MEAN TO ELIMINATE DRUGS IN YOUR LIFE. YOU HAVE NO1 
DONE THAT AND YOU'VE INDICATED THAT IT'S SOMEONE ELSE'S 
RESPONSIBILITY 'CAUSE YOU HAVEN'T DONE THAT. I DISAGREE WITH 
THAT. 
MR. BRIGGS: IT'S MY RESPONSIBILITY. 
THE COURT: IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY. THERE'S NO 
QUESTION ABOUT THAT. AND YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IT'S YOUR 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND MAKE THE COMMITMENT SO IT'S LONG-LASTING. 
GIVEN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE, MR. BRIGGS, WHILE I RECOGNIZE 
YOU ARE A YOUNG MAN, I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT YOU'VE BEEN GIVEN 
EVERYTHING THE STATE CAN GIVE TO YOU. YOU'VE BEEN GIVEN 
NUMEROUS OPPORTUNITIES. AP&P IS NOT MODIFYING THE 
RECOMMENDATION NOTWITHSTANDING THE GOOD EFFORTS OF YOUR LAWYE! 
TO LOOK AT THIS ALTERNATIVE. THEREFORE, I THINK IT'S 
APPROPRIATE THAT I FOLLOW THE RECOMMENDATION. AND GIVEN YOUR 
SECOND-DEGREE FELONY CONVICTION, THE POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, MR. BRIGGS, I RESPECTFULLY SENTENCE YOU TO UTAH 
STATE PRISON FOR AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF ONE TO 15 YEARS. I 
IMPOSE A PUBLIC DEFENDER FEE OF $500 BY WAY OF RESTITUTION. 
YOU HAVE 30 DAYS FROM TODAY TO APPEAL. IF YOU DO NOT DO SO, 
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YOU ARE WAIVING YOUR RIGHT TO AN APPEAL. AND I'M GOING TO 
ORDER THAT YOU REMAIN IN CUSTODY FOR TRANSPORTATION TO THE 
UTAH STATE PRISON: 
(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, JOANNE PRATT, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 
PROCEEDINGS, VIDEOTAPED AT THE TIME OF THEIR OCCURRENCE, WERE 
SUBSEQUENTLY REDUCED BY ME TO PRINTED TRANSCRIPT FORM AS 
HEREINBEFORE APPEARING; 
THAT I WAS NOT PRESENT AT ANY OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
HEREINBEFORE REPRESENTED; 
BUT THAT SAID TRANSCRIPTION CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND 
CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY 
ABILITY TO SO TRANSCRIBE; 
DATED THIS /£* DAY OF ^ sufihjwJbQ-S^ 2005. 
JOANNE PRATT, RPR 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Defendant David Sousa appeals from a 
district court order denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. The case is before 
the court on its own motion for summary 
affirmance. See Utah R.App. P. 10(e). We 
affirm. 
Defendant claims that the district court 
erred by denying his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea, which was based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel. However, 
Defendant failed to file a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea "within 30 days 
after the entry of the plea." Utah Code Ann. 
5 77-13-6f2Yb) (1999). That failure 
"extinguished] [Defendant's] right to 
challenge the validity of the guilty plea on 
appeal," State v. Reyes, 2002 UT I3,1f 3, 40 
P.3d 630, including his right to challenge the 
validity of the plea on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See State 
v. Melo, 2001 UT ADD 392,11 If 7- 8, 40 P.3d 
646. Therefore, the district court correctly 
concluded that it did not have jurisdiction 
to consider Defendant's ineffective 
assistance claim and correctly denied his 
motion to withdraw his plea. 
For the first time on appeal, Defendant 
claims that his counsel was ineffective 
because his counsel did not timely move to 
withdraw the plea. However, section 77-13-
6 does not permit this court, in this direct 
appeal, to extend the thirty-day period for 
filing a motion to withdraw a plea or, 
although that period has run, to set aside 
Defendant's plea because of post-plea 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See id.; 
Melo. 2001 UT App 392 at ^ If 7-8. 
Defendant contends that not considering this 
ineffective assistance claim violates his right 
to seek redress from the courts. See Utah 
Const, art. I, § 11. That argument is 
unavailing given the availability of redress 
by petition for post-conviction relief. 
In response to this court's motion for 
summary affirmance, Defendant claims that 
section 77-13-6 is unconstitutional as 
applied to him because he did not discover 
that he might be deported based on his plea 
until after the thirty-day period for filing a 
motion to withdraw his plea expired. 
However, although Defendant 
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acknowledged that his motion to withdraw 
his plea was not timely, he did not raise the 
constitutionality of section 77-13-6 before 
the district court. This court will not 
consider issues, including constitutional 
issues, raised for the first time on appeal. 
See, e.g., State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 
920. 922 (Utah Ct.App. 1991V 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
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